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F orce Versus Food 

Introduction 
The division of the world into "developed" and "under-
developed" areas is a commonplace of post-war political journalism. 
The result has been that the intelligent reader of the daily press-
in Paris, Karachi, Djakarta, or Washington-has little choice but 
to equate economic development with the much narrower concept 
of technological achievement. Factories and mines, railway and 
telegraph networks, mechanized agriculture-all these are taken 
as the standards of a "developed" economy. Conversely, the term 
"under-developed" suggests the peasant household, rudimentary 
communications, depressed per capita income, and unsatisfactory 
public hygiene-all of which contribute to a "low" standard of 
living. 
These notions, sweeping and arbitrary though they are, have 
gained wide acceptance. They have helped to shape the emotional 
and intellectual climate in which modern statesmen, journalists, edu-
cators, and the great mass of humanity all work and live. 
But frequently the result of such schematic thinking on the prob-
lems of the world's economies have been unfortunate and productive 
of misunderstanding. In the West, these concepts have sometimes led 
to a complacency which might easily be, and in fact has been, inter-
preted elsewhere as an unfeeling arrogance. In some regions of Asia 
and Africa, on the other hand, an honestly derived sense of depriva-
tion and poverty has been converted into an uncritical hostility 
toward the highly industrialized West and used to further zenopho-
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bic tendencies and extremist movements which grasp at unrealistic 
and "patent" solutions to the all too real problems of so-called under-
developed economies. Finally, the experience of the past decade 
suggests that the concept of economic development has been employed 
as a political and ideological weapon by a number of Communist 
countries, in an effort to advertize the advantages of their own 
planned economies and in a parallel attempt to foster diplomatic and 
commercial alignments. 
From all this it is fair to conclude that the concept of economic 
development needs more precise definition if it is to be employed 
intelligently. And the very first thing that needs saying is that the 
economic development of a country involves a great deal more than 
the relatively obvious presence of heavy industry and mechanical 
equipment. In the final analysis, it is not the availability of industrial 
equipment alone which determines the degree of economic develop-
ment or the standard of living, but rather how a people lives. In other 
words, one must first ask whether a nation suffers want, if so of what 
kind, and to what manner of use its available resources are put. 
To realize this point, one need only note that several Asian and 
African countries are considered under-developed not only because 
they suffer from a shortage of industrial equipment but also because 
they are victims of malnutrition and recurrent famine. It is certainly 
true that such countries need industrialization: that they require rail-
ways and motor transport, cement factories, and electric generating 
stations. But it is equally important to inquire into the diverse pur-
poses which these products of modern technology are intended to 
serve. It is certainly undeniable that any country, particularly one 
which is primarily agrarian, will take pride in the construction of an 
important rail or road network, or in the erection of a plant capable of 
producing machine tools. 
Yet, for an economist, a complex machine is not of itself an index 
of economic development. The use to which the machine is put is 
crucial. If a diesel locomotive is employed only to transport muni-
tions, to move bodies of troops, or to fetch the raw materials necessary 
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for the construction of yet more locomotives, it is doubtful that it 
contributes significantly to economic development. But if its use is so 
diversified as to include the carrying of produce to market and fin-
ished products to agrarian centers, if the raw materials which are 
necessary for its construction have not been obtained at the expense of 
plows and irrigation equipment, if the real income of the community 
which it serves is sufficient to make travel and the exchange of goods 
both possible and advantageous, then this particular machine does 
contribute to economic growth and well-being. 
All this means that "industrialization" cannot be viewed as an 
end in itself if the real goal is the genuine economic development of a 
country or territory, Economic development is not necessarily synony-
mous with industrialization; it really refers to the balanced growth of 
a nation's economy, and hence to the sensible use of its available 
resources. 
The present study may perhaps serve to illustrate this point in 
some detail. In examining the development of Communist agricul-
tural institutions over a period of four decades, it raises some questions 
and suggests a number of lessons which, if not entirely new or origi-
nal, may still be useful and interesting to the general reader, irrespec-
tive of his national allegiance or place of residence. 
No one, of course, can seriously doubt that the Soviet Union, and 
at least some of its East European dependencies, have attained a 
degree of industrialization which enables them to produce capital 
goods and a variety of scientific and mechanical equipment in sub-
stantial quantities. Similarly, most informed observers would ac-
knowledge that some Communist countries-and the Soviet Union in 
particular-have shown themselves capable of offering the products 
of their domestic industry in the international market. And certainly 
they have succeeded in building, and maintaining, one of the largest 
and most formidable military arsenals in existence. 
The relative speed of these achievements has attracted considerable 
attention and comment, even among those observers who are aware 
of the staggering human and political price which the Communists 
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have had to pay. In recent years especially, a tendency has de-
veloped among some non-European commentators to display a 
marked degree of interest in the adaptability of Soviet solutions 
to the problems of their own economies. 
On the whole, the sources of this interest are comprehensible. 
Essentially they derive from an urgent desire to "catch up," and 
from a deeply felt need for self-assertion, as '\-vell as from a rather 
less tenable tendency to equate independence with self-sufficiency. 
But when this much is said, it can still be argued with cause that 
such interest arises from a misunderstanding which, in the final 
anal ysis, derives from the attempt to equate industrialization for 
its own sake with sound national economic development. 
Such an equation simply cannot be sustained in practice. If 
the goal of organized national economic activity is to advance 
the welfare of the people, then it follows that the chief problem 
in any modern community is to aid those elements in the popula-
tion with the smallest real income. And in all but perhaps a half-
dozen countries of the world that means devoting primary attention 
to the peasant-whether he is engaged in the production of rice, 
wheat, millet, or maize. There is no inference that this process can 
be accomplished without industrialization. Quite obviously it cannot. 
In some countries of East and South-East Asia, for instance, one 
of the major impediments to sound economic development-which 
can only be overcome by a systematic program of industrialization 
-lies in rural overpopulation. Clearly, this is a problem not suscep-
tible of solution merely by fostering an increase in the productivity 
of agriculture. That might only result in agricultural under-employ-
ment, and the real solution would still lie in the transfer of popula-
tion from the land to a variety of urban and industrial occupations. 
Similarly, it may be considered axiomatic that one of the funda-
mental requirements of any "under-developed" economy must be 
the increase of the national income. And the latter would be almost 
impossible of accomplishment without some measure of industriali-
zation and without the resultant accumulations of net profit to the 
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community, over and above its total consumption in the form of 
goods and services. 
Yet, the fact that industrialization per se is not and can never 
be the simple panacea which some have tended to make it remains 
true. For the under-developed countries, the road to sound economic 
development still lies in a consciously planned attempt to harmonize 
and coordinate agrarian and industrial growth. 
It is a matter of record that in some parts of the world the goal 
of industrialization was less transformation of the economic and 
social level of the masses than the desire to achieve military superi-
ority over one's neighbors, or else to attain an absolute degree of 
economic self-sufficiency, because this seemed desirable from a 
political standpoint and feasible in terms of the availability of basic 
raw materials. Indeed, industrialization has been undertaken by a 
number of Communist states for a combination of both reasons, 
as well as in an attempt to realize in practice the substance of 
an arbitrary and dogmatic ideology. 
To the highly interdependent contemporary \vorld which has 
now entered the era of atomic technology and may use this tech-
nology in peace or war, these are reasons for industrialization 
which, while they may be comprehensible, do not seem to be very 
sound. The recent past shows that, whether in the case of Nazi 
Germany, Soviet Russia, Imperial Japan, or "People's Democratic 
Hungary," the price paid by the populations was exorbitant, and 
the results for the world at large have been far from satisfactory. 
In effect, each of these motivations for programs of precipitous 
industrialization has led to war, totalitarianism, and colonialism. 
That they may have brought certain benefits to some small group 
is not so significant as the fact that they have never brought as 
many benefits for the entire population as a balanced concept of 
economic development, however under-developed a particular econ-
omy might be. 
To illustrate this point in detail, an economist could present 
a variety of evidence and case histories in abundance. Yet few of 
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these histories are as instructive as the forty-year record of the 
U mon of Soviet Socialist Republics and more recently, of its smaller 
East European satellites. These histories may seem like dazzling 
achievements only to those who do not know them in detail. While 
impressive in some respects they are also a chronicle replete with 
error, cruelty, and, most damaging for our purposes, economic 
malfunctioning. The vital question before us is only whether and 
how many of them are really good lessons which are worthwhile 
learning and repeating. 
The pages which follow do not attempt to prejudge this issue. 
They present a simple discussion of Communist agricultural institu-
tions and practices, and as such they constitute a brief inquiry into 
the Soviet theory of economic development. Neither here nor else-
where can a tenable attempt be made to minimize certain aspects 
of the Soviet industrial achievement. Yet to repeat, it is legitimate 
to question whether that achievement constitutes a real and useful 
development of the national economy. 
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Agriculture 'In the Communist 
Economic System 
In the four decades following the Revolution of 1917 a unique 
form of agricultural organization took shape within the Soviet orbit, 
reflecting Communist theory regarding the land and the uses to 
which it should be put. The four essential features which charac-
terize this system may be summarized as follows: 
1. State, or "public," ownership of all land; 
2. Cultivation of the land not by individual families or 
farmers, but by clusters of many households function-
ing together in larger units known as "collective" or 
" " f state arms; 
3. The existence of a state-owned and state-operated 
pool of all agricultural machinery, and a centralized 
system of crop collection effected through a state-
wide network of machine tractor stations (MTS); 
4. The regular and recurrent imposition of delivery 
quotas for all types of agricultural produce on each 
of the producing units, at prices determined by the 
state in its capacity as the principal purchaser. 
As might well be expected of all institutions which are in 
process of growth and development, the Soviet and other Com-
munist agricultural systems in Europe and Asia have not remained 
wholly static. They have experienced varying degrees of change, 
occasioned either by ideological considerations or by the necessity 
to adapt the essentials of the system to prevailing economic, po-
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litical, or geographic conditions. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that 
the four basic features have always been retained· in recogniz-
able form as characteristic hallmarks of Communist agricultural 
organization. 
What have been the determining factors which have helped 
to shape this specific form of organization? One has certain I y 
been Communist policy in general. Another appears to be the stage 
of economic development reached by a given country at the time 
of the introduction of a Communist system. Both deserve some 
further examination. 
Informed observers have often noted the curious fact that 
neither the Soviet Union nor any other Communist state has 
ever developed a coherent or really consistent approach to the 
problems of agricultural policy. Instead, agriculture has been 
regarded as only one among several instruments to be employed 
in the struggle to attain larger political goals, and as an adjunct 
to the industrial development schemes of Communist Party plan-
ners. In other words, orthodox Communists have always adopted 
an essentially ad hoc attitude toward agricultural problems-so 
much so that it is almost true to say that they have never been 
reall y interested in agricultural policy at all, except as an expres-
sion of their program for non-urban populations in general. In 
short, orthodox Communists have never wanted to, and therefore 
have never succeeded in, differentiating between the peasantry as a 
sociological and political entity and agriculture as a form of eco-
nomic activity. Hence, from the very beginning, the development 
of Communist agriculture has been shaped rather more by po-
litical than economic considerations and has always been influ-
enced, most decisively, by a deep-rooted distrust of the peasantry 
which is inherent in traditional Marxist thought. 
The peasant, engaged as he traditionally is in individual pro-
duction, has always been seen through Communist eyes as a back-
ward stage of development when compared with the modern 
factory worker, whose economic activity is essentially of a coopera-
tive nature. Similarly, the peasant's proverbial attachment to his 
8 
land and his innate conservatism have tended to alienate him from 
the urban-oriented Communist party whose preoccupation with 
the industrial proletariat has usually led it to regard him with dislike 
and suspicion. Moreover, the doctrinaire conception of a Com-
munist society is naturally quite incompatible with the continued 
existence of a sphere of economic activity dominated by private 
property and private enterprise, and therefore characterized by what 
the Marxist describes as "pre-capitalist" production relationships. 
The combined effect of these antagonisms between Party and 
peasantry serves to explain not only the Communist attitude toward 
agriculture, but also the long-term ambition of every Communist 
regime, which is to transform the peasantry into a rural proletariat, 
employed and remunerated on the same terms as the urban worker. 
This program has not been, and was not intended to be, realized 
all at once. Yet it remains as much of a basic objective today as it 
was in the early and turbulent days which followed the Bolshevik 
revolution. Expropriation of the land, machine tractor stations, 
collective and state farms are still seen by Communist theoreticians 
as necessary milestones along the road to the farming city or 
" d" agrogoro . 
Apart from these socio-political and rather theoretical considera-
tions, Soviet agricultural policy has also been shaped by the rather 
immediate determination of the Soviet leaders to make reality con-
form to theory by forcibly transforming the USSR into an indus-
trialized state. 
The Bolsheviks had, after all, triumphed in a country which, 
quite contrary to orthodox Marxist theory, was not highly indus-
trialized and which could not boast of a powerful or numerous 
urban proletariat. In Leninist terms, therefore, it lacked the major 
prerequisites for the construction of a socialist state and for the 
establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat as conceived in 
Communist ideology. Moreover, these doctrinal considerations 
were given added urgency in the eyes of the early Soviet govern-
ment because of their experiences during the period of civil war 
and foreign intervention which followed close on the heels of the 
9 
October Revolution. The Bolsheviks saw in these events not only 
their own weakness, but also ample evidence of the hostility felt 
toward them by the rest of the world. Industrialization therefore 
seemed imperative to them on both purely practical and on the-
oretical grounds. 
The implications of this decision for Soviet agriculture were 
momentous and far-reaching. Once made, it committed the Soviet 
government to a ruthless search for the two essential ingredients 
of industrialization-capital and manpower. Unable or unwilling 
to obtain foreign investments or technical aid, the Soviets deter-
mined to finance their program of industrial expansion from do-
mestic resources alone. And this in practical terms meant that it 
would be financed from agriculture, as the only available resource. 
Similarly, the search for manpower could only be realized in 
con junction with the establishment of agricultural institutions 
which could guarantee that a substantial portion of the rural popu-
lation vlould be forced to migrate from the land into the city 
and the factory. 
The result has been that, for almost four decades, Soviet rural 
policy-if indeed one can call it a policy-has been directed not 
only, or even primarily, toward the maintenance or improvement 
of agricultural production, but toward the achievement of certain 
social and ideological aims on the one hand and the accumulation 
of capital for an industrialization program on the other. 
If, however, orthodox Communism has been influenced in its 
attitude toward agriculture by a profound distrust of the peasant, 
as well as by its overwhelming desire to find security and reas-
surance through an industrialization program, even in the years 
following the second \V orId War it has also had to reckon with the 
degree of economic development reached by a given country at 
the time of the Communist assumption of power. With the excep-
tion of Czechoslovakia and the so-called German Democratic Re-
public, all members of the Soviet orbit, including the Soviet Union 
itself, were primarily agricultural. The bulk of their populations 
were engaged in tilling the land, and by far the largest part of the 
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national product originated in agriculture. All of the countries in 
question, of course, had some industrial potential, but as in the 
case of Czarist Russia, so in that of the People's Democracies of 
Eastern Europe-their industries tended to lag behind this po-
tential. They could, therefore, be considered economically retarded, 
at least so far as they displayed one of the classic features of 
so-called economic "backwardness" in the form of agricultural 
under-employment. 
The presence of more people on the land than necessary to 
raise the crop which the soil is capable of yielding acted as an 
added incentive for the Soviet and the later satellite industrializa-
tion drives. It appeared to provide an economically justifiable reason 
for instigating a transfer of population which, in turn, had the 
added advantage of helping to solve the ideologically significant 
"peasant problem." 
In the light of this discussion, it should now be clear that 
agriculture, as a national industry vital to any country-whether 
large or small-has suffered systematic neglect in all parts of the 
Communist world over a period of four decades. First within the 
Soviet Union, and presently in the other states of the Communist 
orbit, agriculture was relegated to a secondary role for a combination 
of ideological, political, and economic reasons. The result has been 
the development of more than a half-dozen national economies 
remarkable for their imbalance and distinguished by their recurrent 
need for emergency drives designed to bolster an inadequate and 
unstable agricultural output. Even though their industrialization 
drives have achieved a relative measure of success, the Soviet and 
other Communist governments have failed to institute a really basic 
improvement in their agricultural structure. Although perhaps in 
a somewhat modified sense, it still remains true that Communist 
policy is less interested in helping to secure a permanent improve-
ment in agricultural production than it is in achieving certain 
other aims to which purely agricultural considerations must remain 
subordinate. A brief account of the evolution of agricultural In-
stitutions in the Soviet Union will help to illustrate this point. 
11 
The Development of Soviet 
Agricultural Institutions 
The development of Soviet agricultural institutions over a period 
of forty years can be divided into several fairly distinct periods, 
each with certain characteristic features. 
The first of these phases is that of "War Communism," or 
the period covering the civil war and its immediate aftermath, 
from late 1917 to early 1921. Essentially this was a time of com-
plete economic chaos, in industry as well as agriculture. 
The Bolsheviks, drawing their principal support from the urban 
proletariat, had relatively few followers among the peasants. While 
they had been among the few political groups to give their em-
phatic blessing to the expropriation of landed estates without com-
pensation by the peasants since the spring of 1917, their equivocal 
position on private land ownership and distribution had failed 
to gain them much influence in the countryside. The party which 
did have by far the largest following in the rural areas was that of the 
left-wing Social Revolutionaries. Consequently, in order to gain 
the support of the peasants, the Bolsheviks in their Land Decree 
of November 1917 in effect adopted the policy platform of the 
Social Revolutionaries, expropriating the large estates and dis-
tributing the land to "those who tilled it." 
F or reasons which have already been noted, the Bolsheviks 
did not, however, intend to organize agriculture along the lines 
advocated by the Social Revolutionaries, as promised by their own 
propagandists. The Land Decree of February 1918, although restat-
ing the general lines of the November decree, already mentioned 
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the desirability of promoting a "collective economy in agriculture 
. . . with a view to a later transition to socialistic agriculture." 
At the time this meant little in practice. The land hunger of 
the Russian peasants was so great that they divided the large 
estates once held by the aristocracy and the monasteries with 
little regard for the specific wording of any decree. The division 
of land proceeded spontaneously, and would no doubt have taken 
place whether the Bolsheviks-or any other government-had ap-
proved it or not. Even though these estates may have been viewed 
as the only practical or even possible nuclei for the formation of 
collective or state farms, the whole question of the socialization of 
the countryside had nevertheless to remain academic during these 
early stages. In 1917 and early 1918 political considerations in any 
event dictated quite another course. Above all else the Bolsheviks 
needed to win the support of the peasantry and to find a means 
of raising the output of food. The job of changing the social struc-
ture of the countryside would have to wait. 
This initial caution in the Soviet dealings with the peasantry 
was, of course, only a counsel of expediency-not a matter of con-
viction. Having seized power for the first time the Bolsheviks 
found themselves in a precarious situation. They did not control 
large sections of the country, and they faced political disorder 
in those which they did control. Industrial production had come 
to a virtual standstill, currency inflation had reached runaway 
proportions, and the peasants had no incentive to bring their 
surpluses to market. The Ukraine, at that time the "breadbasket" 
of all Russia, was to remain a confused battlefield for years, and 
this, of course, made the problem of feeding the urban proletariat 
and the rapidly growing Red Army ever more acute. Under such 
circumstances initial caution soon gave way to what seemed to be 
the only possible solution-coercion. By recruiting and dispatching 
small groups of so-called committees of "poor peasants" from the 
countryside and organizing well-armed "food detachments of 
workers and poor peasants" from the cities, the Communist govern-
ment in effect began to requisition all surplus produce from the 
13 
peasantry and, driven by almost desperate need, usually exacted a 
great deal more than actual "surplus." Perhaps the best summary 
of this program was given by Lenin himself: 
The peculiarity of War Communism consisted in the fact that 
we really took from the peasants all their surpluses, and some-
times even what was not surplus but part of what was neces-
sary to feed the peasant, took it to cover the costs of the army 
and to maintain the workers. We took it for the most part on 
credit, for paper money .... :11< 
The consequences of such a policy could well be anticipated. 
Not only did the peasants attempt to hide their surpluses (which 
was often difficult because of the existence of the "committees of 
poor peasants"), but they also began to curtail their output. Ac-
cordingly, in the short period of two years-which were char-
acterized not only by civil war, general economic chaos, and the 
peasant resistance which became a widespread response to forced 
requisitions-an almost total collapse of agricultural production 
ensued. In late 1920 the sown acreage in the Soviet Union had 
fallen to . almost a quarter of the pre-war figure, and food produc-
tion suffered accordingly. 
With the end of military operations against the dissident 
"White" armies, peasant resistance increased, particularly as the 
danger of actual fighting ended and as famine began to develop 
not only in urban but in rural areas as well. Peasant opposition 
took the form of local uprisings and eventually culminated in the 
armed insurrection of the sailors of the Red Fleet at Kronstadt. The 
sailors' demands reflected not only their own wishes but also those 
of the peasantry, and were the more serious since the Baltic Fleet 
had been one of the first and best units of the Bolshevik forces. 
Only then did it become obvious to the Soviet government that 
the policies of the past three years were unworkable. It was no 
longer any use attempting to extract, by force or persuasion, farm 
:II< Lenin, Sochineniia, voL XXVI. 
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The peasantry owned about half of Russia's farm land in 1914, and seized the rest during the revolutionary upheaval of 1917. 
The Bolsheviks first encouraged these seizures. Once in power, they nationalized the land and introduced collectivization. 
Peasant resistance to confiscations and low prices forced adoption of the rela-
tively liberal NEP in the early 1920's. Farmers like those of Central Asia (above) 
could take their produce to free markets. But the Kremlin regarded such 
concessions only as a makeshift . With the first Five Year Plan, building of 
collective farms (below) again became one of the Soviet's highest ambitions. 
surpluses which simply did not exist. The time had come to think 
of producing first and of requisitioning later. 
This period of early War Communism is interesting because it 
illustrates succinctly Communist thinking about agriculture. It 
demonstrates that Bolshevik agricultural policy was, from the very 
beginning, dictated by such considerations as the need to woo 
the peasantry from the Social Revolutionary Party, by the desire 
to split, and therefore to weaken, the peasants through the creation 
of the Committees of Poor Peasants, and by a willingness to engage 
in the most ruthless exploitation through forced requisitions based 
on the significant but often erroneous assumption that the peasants 
had surplus stocks. Only in the very last phase of this period, 
and then only because of dire necessity, were the Bolsheviks driven 
to realize that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent 
that dogma, ideology, and political considerations would have to be 
sacrificed if there was to be any food at all. 
The period of War Communism is also significant because it 
marked the birth and provided the testing ground of certain Com-
munist techniques which were to become standard features of the 
system not only in the Soviet Union itself but in the East European 
satellites. These techniques included the creation of committees 
of poor peasants, which served as instruments of denunciation and 
exaction and shattered any political unity among the peasants 
which could be directed against the Communist regime. They 
included the imposition of arbitrary quotas, or arbitrarily defined 
"surpluses," which bore little or no relation to the crops actually 
harvested. And finally, they involved the use of a military or para-
military worker's militia, to collect the harvest from a reluctant 
and frequently hostile peasantry. 
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The New Economic Policy 
The virtual economic collapse which marked the end of the 
period of War Communism was remedied only by measures which 
led to the inauguration of a so-called "New Economic Policy." 
In this period the attempt to impose state control over all economic 
activity was abandoned and a relatively liberal economic practice 
adopted in an effort to give all workers, whether rural or indus-
trial, sufficient incentive to produce. 
In agriculture this meant the end of forced requisitions and, 
instead, the introduction of a tax in kind, calculated as a percen-
tage of the crop harvested and adjusted in such a manner as to 
offer rebates to those peasants who were prepared to expand the 
cultivated areas of their farms. The New Economic Policy, of 
course, like most liberalizations, was a gradual process. The in-
troduction of a tax in kind was followed by a number of other 
measures, such as permission to trade freely in agricultural produce, 
and finally even the right to use hired labor on privately owned 
farms. In effect, what this meant was that, for a number of years 
at least, the Soviet government was prepared to ignore the organi-
zation of the agricultural economy and to rely on the operations 
of the market to stimulate production. As a result the sown area, 
which had fallen to about 77.7 million hectares in 1922, reached 
110.3 million hectares in 1926, which is an increase of 42 per cent 
in no more than four years. Almost the same growth was shown 
by the grain area, which rose by 41 per cent during the same 
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period. * The rate of recovery was in fact rapid enough so that 
in 1927, or ten years after the Revolution, the sown area had re-
turned almost to the pre-war level. A parallel recovery was regis-
tered in livestock population and production. By 1927 the total 
number of farm animals was larger than it had been in 1916. This 
aspect of recovery, however, was somewhat uneven. Thus, in 
1927 there were some 31.6 million horses in the USSR as compared 
to 35.8 million in 1916, or about 88 per cent of the pre-war total. 
On the other hand, cattle herds were 12 per cent higher in 1927 
than in 1916, hogs exceeded the 1916 totals by 10 per cent, and 
sheep and goats by about 15 per cent. ** 
But the New Economic Policy had never been envisaged as a 
lasting departure. Lenin and many of his associates considered a 
policy which favored the peasant in his right to private property 
and conceded the strength of the profit motive as little short of a 
betrayal of the Communist ideal. 
There were, however, a number of other and less purely ideo-
logical factors which contributed to the termination of the New 
Economic Policy and with it of the era of peace in the country-
side. These began to play an increasingly important part in the 
late 1920's. 
First there was the fact that though agricultural production 
had almost recovered its pre-war levels, the marketing of agricul-
tural products had failed to do so. In the crucial case of grain, for 
example, sales in 1927 were no more than about 38 per cent of pre-
war. Even if allowance is made for the smaller land area of the 
Soviet Union as compared to Czarist Russia, and due account taken 
of other statistical variables, such a decline-given the intervening 
growth in population-was an extremely alarming phenomenon. 
Other agricultural products did not fare so badly, even though 
none achieved a sales volume comparable to pre-war years. Thus, 
... Sotsialisticheskoe Stl'oitel'stvo, Moscow, 1936 . 
...... V. P. Nifontov, Zhivotnovodstvo SSR v tsifl'akh, Moscow, 1932. 
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1928 marketings of potatoes were 57 per cent of 1913, of sugar beets 
90 per cent, of meat 95 per cent, and of milk and milk products 
89 per cent.* 
The reasons for this decline varied. The Communist party chose 
to find its own reason in the relative inefficiency of the small farm, 
and used this as one of the justifications for its later collectiviza-
tion drive. 
There is ample evidence, however, that the low prices paid 
to the farmers during the years even of the New Economic Policy 
played an even more important part. ** Rising industrial prices 
and relatively stable agricultural prices reduced peasant incomes, 
increased on-the-farm consumption, and diverted much of the sown 
area to crops which could command the highest prices. The result 
was once again a shortage of grain in the cities, which moreover 
were growing rapidly in population as a result of the industriali-
zation program. 
The fact, however, that agricultural commodities were so sig-
nificantly underpriced was itself the result of another complex 
of factors. Thus, the Soviet government, for both ideological and 
intensely practical reasons, was vitally interested in keeping the 
price of foodstuffs low for the urban proletariat, and since the 
general drive to raise capital from internal resources precluded a 
program of agricultural subsidies, the only alternative was to see 
to it that wholesale prices of produce remained artificially de-
pressed. Likewise the Communist Party, while it recognized the 
• All data from Sotsialisticheskoe St1'oitelsrvoJ Moscow, 1936 . 
•• In its position as the largest single purchaser on the market the Soviet 
state played a major role in fixing the price of grain. Although the peasants 
were permitted to sell their grain on the free domestic market, the govern-
ment, through its control of milling, storage, and transport facilities, could 
still make its own bidding price the one at which, in effect, the peasants had 
to sell. Thus grain prices remained too low throughout the second half of the 
1920's, relative not only to industrial products but also to those of other 
agricultural products. The result was that most peasants did not consider 
grain as a useful "cash crop." 
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TABLE I 
THE RECOVERY OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE UNDER THE 
NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 
MILl/ON HECTARES 
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SOWN AREA GRAIN AREA GRAIN PRODUCTION 
It will be seen that, five years after the introduction of the New Economic Policy in 
1921. substantial gains had been made when compared with the catastrophic declines 
which had resulted from war, revolution, and civil strife. Still , on the eve of the first 
Five Year Plan (1928) I the relatively liberal policy of the N.E.P. had not been in 
effect sufficiently long to bring grain production back to the levels which had been 
achieved in 1913. 
Source : Sofsia/isficheskoe StroifeJ'sfvo, Moscow I 1936 
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need for higher food production, was nevertheless not inclined, for 
either political or ideological reasons, to encourage the growth 
of a strong peasantry. The New Economic Policy on the other 
hand, by giving latitude to free enterprise in agriculture and retail 
trade, had given rise to the formation of groups of relatively 
prosperous farmers who were viewed by the Party as potentially 
unreliable and even hostile to the regime. * 
It was feared by certain elements in the Communist leadership 
that the prolongation of this policy would eventually tend to create 
a rural land-owning class, numerous, powerful, and hostile, which 
might eventually out-balance the urban proletariat and thus jeopar-
dize the aims of the entire Communist program. 
But perhaps the most important reason for the abrogation of 
the New Economic Policy was that the Soviet Union was about 
to embark on the industrial revolution which attended the introduc-
tion of the Five Year Plans. The debate regarding the scope and 
speed with which that revolution should be carried out had raged 
within Party ranks for a number of years, and it was this fateful 
struggle between the uncompromising "left" proponents of immedi-
ate and drastic action and the "rightist" opposition which eventu-
all y resulted in the victory of Stalin and the decision, late in 1927, 
to embark immediately on the first of a series of Five Year Plans. 
Even those aspects of the New Economic Policy which applied 
only to agriculture could not survive this basic change in orienta-
tion, simply because the institutions and practices which had been 
* This group of prosperous farmers was generally identified by the 
term "kulaks." The Party and government attempted to equate them in 
some fashion with the pre-revolutionary landlords, but in fact this compari-
son was quite unwarranted. Even though there were still class differences 
in the villages, the land distribution of 1917 had brought about a leveling 
of holdings throughout the countryside. The "kulaks" of 1928 had had a 
scant ten years in which-either through luck or enterprise-to accumulate 
a modest amount of wealth. The attempt to compare them with wealthy 
pre-revolutionary landlords who had inherited land and fortune through 
generations was therefore both inaccurate and extreme. 
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condoned or even encouraged in the agricultural sector under 
the NEP were not adapted to the task which the Communists 
now required of that sector, namely, that of financing industrial 
expanSIon. 
Once again, as in the period of War Communism, agricultural 
development was to be dictated by considerations not primarily 
agricultural. The capital necessary to finance industrialization had 
to be found, and the only available sector of the economy capable 
of bearing the brunt was agriculture. In the words of one Com-
munist leader, "the peasantry had to be squeezed" if factories were 
to be built in the quantity and at the pace which the new policy 
demanded; or, as Lenin had stated in connection with the earlier 
period of War Communism, "surpluses had to be extracted" 
once agaIn. 
Faced with declining prices and this nevI threat to their 
security, the peasants once again reacted by cutting their sales and 
the Communists again responded by resorting to seizures. By 1928 
a number of extraordinary measures were once again in effect. 
Procurement drives were launched by dispatching so-called "red 
trains" of workers and Party members into the countryside to 
seize farm surpluses. The Committees of Poor Peasants vvere re-
vived to serve as instruments for spotting and denouncing the 
owners of grain supplies. Private grain trade was prohibited, and 
harsh penalties were instituted for "speculation" in grain. These 
measures succeeded in increasing both the absolute amounts and 
the "marketed share" of grain obtained from the countryside. * 
But they brought about other and less desirable results, among 
them a decline in sowing and a consequent drop in harvests. Al-
though in 1929 and 1930 the amount of agricultural produce 
delivered to the state did increase, it soon became obvious that 
production would have to rise much more rapidly if it were to 
provide the wherewithal to finance industrial expansion. 
* The marketed share is that part of the harvest which is not retained 
in the countryside. As it increases, the absolute amounts delivered will also 
increase, provided that the harvest either remains constant or increases. 
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Now that war and civil disorder were matters of the past and 
the Communist regime had endured for a full decade, both gov-
ernment and Party felt themselves in a much stronger position 
than in the early days of uncertainty and struggle. The time had 
apparently come to implement theory in practice, by putting the 
dictates of dogma to the test for the first time. As an essential 
concomitant of industrialization, the organization of the agricul-
tural system would need to undergo a total change as well. Private 
farming would have to come to an end and be supplanted by 
collectivized agriculture as the dominant form of rural organiza-
tion and production. 
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Collectivization 
In theories formulated long before the October Revolution, 
Communist writers had defined the ideal form of socialist agricul-
ture in terms of huge, state-controlled rural factories employing 
armies of farm workers on terms as nearly similar to factory em-
ployment as couid be achieved in the countryside. 
The expropriation of the large estates and the New Economic 
Policy had, on the other hand, led to the establishment of 
numerous small, family-sized farms throughout the Soviet Union. 
Thus, at the beginning of the era of Five Year Plans, the goal 
which the Communists envisioned was further avvay than in the 
earliest days of the Civil War. But now that the die had been cast in 
favor of "building socialism in one country"-according to the 
precepts of Josef Stalin-by seeking to create an industrial bastion, 
the ti.me had also come to force agricultural institutions into the 
socialist mold. 
From a political point of view, the architects of the Soviet 
economic development program were motivated by the belief that 
small-scale private enterprise was wholly incompatible with the 
concept of a socialist society. As economists and technicians, they 
were committed to the belief that farming on a large scale was 
more efficient and therefore more desirable. 
Lenin had expressed the political fears of the Bolsheviks when 
he wrote: 
2S 
The small enterprise creates capitalism and the bourgeoisie 
permanently, daily, hourly, inescapable, and on a mass scale.* 
Some years later Josef Stalin, on the eve of the great industrializa-
tion drive, stated the Communist dilemma perhaps with even 
greater clarity: 
"The Soviet power [he said] cannot long be based on two con-
trasting foundations-on a large-scale socialist industry which 
eliminates the capitalist elements, and on a small-scale individual 
peasant economy which creates capitalistic elements."** 
As we have noted, these ideological considerations were reIn-
forced by the conviction that large farm units combined with 
modern mechanical aids would profoundly revolutionize agricul-
tural production. Even though enormously different conditions 
prevailed in the two countries, the United States was greatly ad-
mired for the size of its farms and the extent of their mechanization. 
This intoxication with sheer size and motive power led to the crea-
tion of enormous 100,000 hectare state farms which proved so costly 
and inefficient that they were eventually condemned as manifesta-
tions of "gigantomania" and dissolved. Simultaneously, however:-
the Communists devoted their energies to the speedy creation of 
collective farms. 
The drive, which began in 1928 and gathered momentum rap-
idly in 1929, had reached formidable proportions by 1930. From the 
very beginning, legal proceedings were instituted against "kulaks" 
who, in theory at least, were rich peasants but in practice proved 
to be almost anyone who refused to join a cooperative, was disliked 
by his neighbors, or was considered politically unreliable. The 
Committees of Poor Peasants were revived, and with them came 
a return to the use of widespread denunciations as a pretext for 
confiscation and seizure. A complex system of discriminatory 
measures was instituted to be enforced both by the army and 
:II: V. 1. Lenin, Works, Vol. XXV, p. 173. 
* * J. V. Stalin, Problems of Leninism, Moscow 1934, p. 362. 
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police. In fact, the cumulative force of this drive was such that, 
in three short years, more than 50 per cent of the Russian peasantry 
had been driven into collective farms. This was class war in the 
fullest sense of the term, directed as it was toward the total "liqui-
dation of the kulak as a class," the confiscation of his property, and 
the rescinding of his civil rights. The speed and violence with 
which this drive was carried out could not help but seriously affect 
output once again. As in the days of War Communism, chaos 
reigned in the countryside, and even though the Soviet state was 
infinitely more powerful in 1930 than it had been ten years earlier 
it was again obliged to call a temporary halt to a program which 
had gone too far too fast. Stalin was forced to write his famous 
open letter to the Communist Party entitled "Dizziness from 
Successes."* In it he "condemned" the excesses of local authorities 
who had become intoxicated with the apparent success of the col-
lectivization campaign and reminded the zealots that membership 
in the collective farms must be on a "voluntary" basis. 
The reaction was immediate. More than half of those who had 
"voluntarily" joined the collective farms left them. In the RSFSR, 
the largest constituent republic in the Soviet Union, the percentage 
of collectivized households fell from 60 to 23 within two months of 
the publication of the letter. 
But at this point there could be no more turning back. Coercive 
measures which now included large-scale deportations were soon 
revived; by mid-1931 about half of all peasant households were 
once again collectivized, and by 1932 effective peasant resistance 
was broken. 
But the collapse of peasant resistance was not solely due to the 
application of force and violence. It was as much the result of 
the great famine which ravaged the Soviet Union during 1932-33 
as of Communist terror and class warfare. The famine which 
made these years so notable was, of course, not brought on by 
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The above table illustrates the extent to which the end of civil war and the partial 
reinstatement of personal incentives under the New Economic Policy contributed to the 
growth of livestock in the Soviet Union. The destruction which had resulted from 
the first World War and the internal disorders which followed was more than 
compensated for by 1926. Only the number of horses remained slightly below the 
pre-war figure. 
Source: V. P. Nifontov, Zhivofnovodsfvo SSSR v fsifrakh, Moscow, 1932 
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reduced crop production alone but also by the persistently exces-
sive government requisitions which were a product of the regime's 
policy of exacting fixed delivery quotas for export and shipment to 
the urban centers, quite irrespective of the actual size of annual 
crop production. Had the crops been adequate, there might have 
been enough to meet the needs not only of the government but 
of the peasantry as well; since they clearly were not, there was not 
enough grain left in the producing areas for consumption by the 
rural population. 
Thus the poor harvests of the early 1930's were not the result 
of adverse weather conditions, but more directly of the collectiviza-
tion drive itself. Even the dislocations which might have been 
brought on by an orderly change-over to collectivization would 
have been significant enough; but as the collectivization drive as-
sumed the proportions of genuine class warfare in the countryside, 
the results were bound to become disastrous. Crops were not har-
vested; peasants, who were left with little if any incentive to 
produce, destroyed what small surpluses they had rather than 
hand them over to the state; and they slaughtered their livestock 
in order to feed themselves rather than surrender their animals 
to the "collectivized" farms. The consequence of this policy was 
general famine on a massive scale. 
The Soviet government has never published adequate or ac-
curate data on this period, and in the early 1930's it also banned 
foreign observers from famine areas, so that it has always been 
difficult to estimate the actual number of people who perished 
during 1932 and 1933. It is only possible to make some reasonably 
accurate estimates. Thus, by counting from the 1926 census onward 
to the mid-1930's (that is, applying growth rates for 1926 cumula-
tively) and again counting backward from the next census which 
was held in 1939, a discrepancy of about five-and-one-half million 
people will be noted. The only apparent explanation for this 
loss in population can be a large and abrupt increase in the mor-
tality rate during the mid-thirties.* This figure, it may be added, is 
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much more conservative than many estimates by observers who 
were in the Soviet Union at the time, or who subsequently visited 
the famine-stricken areas. While a wholly accurate count is not 
possible even today, there can be no doubt that about five million 
people, at the least, lost their lives as a result of famine, mass 
deportations, and imprisonments, all of which characterized the 
great collectivization drive of the early 1930's. 
But if it is true that hunger and widespread starvation did 
much to break whatever resistance the peasantry could muster 
against the Communists, the famine also inflicted a severe setback 
to Soviet agriculture itself. Fields remained fallow, harvests were 
left to rot, and livestock were slaughtered. In theory at least, three 
years had been enough to achieve the collectivization of the bulk of 
Soviet land holdings, but the output of these holdings had declined 
catastrophically in the process. 
The statistical data detailing these losses in output have re-
mained as much of an official secret as those dealing with the loss 
of human life. In the 20 years from approximately 1930 to 1950 
either information was suppressed completely or the published 
figures were demonstrably distorted.~X<* 
The first technique was essentially simple: few and meaningless 
figures were released, which bore little if any resemblance to 
reality. The second technique, involving deliberate misrepresent a-
'*' A reduction in birth rates which could bring about such a population 
decline in so short a time is almost inconceivable. 
'*'. Any reader interested in this topic has only to compare the quantity 
of data published before and after 1930. He will note that the first Five 
Year Plan was published in two editions consisting of three large volumes. 
The second Five Year Plan was detailed in one small volume. The third 
and the first post-World War II Five Year Plans were published in the form 
of small pamphlets only. At the same time, some of the most informative 
Soviet journals, including the excellent Economic Review} stopped publica-
t ion. Even the annual Control Figures ceased to print extensive or meaning-
ful data on sowing yields, deliveries, agricultural prices, livestock figures, 
and other basic data. 
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tion, usually called for the selection of base years which, by their 
very choice, were bound to show favorable but illusory results.'*' 
The third and most famous of these techniques was based on the 
concept of the "biological yield," which required a new method of 
harvest reporting so designed as to give a gross overstatement of 
crop production.** 
Under the best of circumstances crop estimates and actual har-
vests are bound to differ, if only because of genuine errors and 
unexpected events such as hailstorms, heavy rains, and other natural 
phenomena. The concept of "biological yield" is, therefore, all the 
more rash and inaccurate since it tends, quite obviously, to increase 
rather than reduce the margin of probable error. As used in the 
Soviet Union it introduced a systematic upward bias because it 
allowed for a margin of error which was far too low. The dis-
.. A classic example can be found in the calculations which were used 
to hide livestock losses. This was done by comparing livestock herds in the 
collective farms at the beginning of the Five Year Plan with the collec-
tivized livestock population of 1937, or some other such year. This statistical 
deception was based on the omission of the obvious fact that by 1937 almost 
100 per cent of all livestock was collectivized, while in 1928 the com-
parable percentage was well below five per cent. Inevitably, therefore, the 
spurious results of any such calculation showed a spectacular increase under 
the Five Year Plans . 
.. :It By using this method the statistician was not asked to report the 
barn crop-as had been done in the Soviet Union before the 1930"s and as 
it is still done everywhere else. In other words, the reported crop was not 
the amount which actually found its way into the barns. Instead, an estimate 
of the potential crop was made in the fields before the actual harvest. 
Then, this estimate was "corrected" downward to allow for potential losses 
and reported as the actual harvest. At first the users of this method made 
some attempt at objectivity by allowing for a ten per cent loss between 
the field and the barn, and by careful surveys in the field. Later on, even 
this pretense was dropped, and the technique degenerated into pure farce 
as shown by this definition from an official publication which appeared 
as late as 1944: "The harvest on the root, which is determined by sight 
appraisal about one week before the start of the harvest, is accepted as the 
actual crop. This appraisal is made for each crop once a year." Dictionary 
Handbook on Social Economic Statistics, Moscow, 1944, p. 88. 
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organized and apathetic kolkhozes lost a much higher percentage 
of crops between the field and the barn than Soviet statisticians 
were permitted to account for. The extent of this loss could be 
calculated with considerable precision if the Soviet government 
had ever published its data in terms of both barn and biological 
yields, or had done so for at least one year. This, however, was 
precisely what the Soviets did not wish to do; at first they published 
crop data without even calling attention to the fact that a change 
in reporting methods had taken place. To further confuse the 
situation, the "loss margins" which the statisticians used in succes-
sive years were changed so as to keep some relationship between 
the crop years, and to continue to report favorable results. This 
was done because the crop losses in the early 1930's were heavier 
than in the later years of the decade. To have used the same loss 
margin in 1937 as in 1933 would have understated the 1937 harvest 
in relation to that of the earlier period, which, of course, would 
have been poor propaganda and therefore entirely undesirable 
from the official point of view. The alternative of putting the 
harvests of the early 30's in proper relationship to those some years 
later would have revealed the full extent of the catastrophe which 
took place during 1932 and 1933. Hence, having once chosen 
what was at best a questionable system, the Soviet regime had no 
choice but to keep on "adjusting" that system by reducing already 
low "loss" allowances in the late 30's and 40's. 
The result of these manipulations has been that Soviet harvests 
were consistently overstated by some 20 per cent for about a fifth 
of a century. 
Once one has understood and made allowance for the over-
statement of Soviet crop statistics, the actual economic costs of the 
collectivization drive can also be assessed with some accuracy. In 
doing so, one discovers that it was not until 1935 that grain produc-
tion regained its 1926 level (76.6 million tons) and not until 1937-
a record year for the USSR-that the grain harvest exceeded the 
highest pre-collectivization harvest, reaching 96 million tons. It 
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Intensified class war and widespread seizures of peasant property marked the launching of the first Five Year Plan. Here, in 
1928, Kuzbek authorities, backed by soldiers (right), conduct expropriation proceedings against an allegedly rich "kulak." 
More than 5 million people perished and more than 75 per cent of Russian land 
was collectivized between 1928 and 1933. The machine-this one purchased 
abroad-became the dominant symbol of the agricultural future in the USSR. 
For ideological rather than practical reasons, the Communists have always 
attempted to introduce factory methods into agricultural production. Here, a 
Machine Tractor Station driver is checked in by a clerk on a collective farm. 
should be noted, however, that this was indeed an exceptional year. 
Both the 1938 and 1939 harvests were not only below that of 1937, 
but below 1930 as well. 
Yield figures are even more revealing. Thus, in 1925 the average 
yield of grain per hectare was 8.3 quintals, which rose to about 
85 quintals in 1930. In 1932 it had fallen to 6.6 quintals (a decline 
of about one-fourth), and it was not until the exceptional 1937 
yields (9.2 quintals per hectare) that the levels of the twenties were 
surpassed. Yet here again this was the result of one exceptional 
year: the 1938 and 1939 grain yields averaged slightly below the 
average for the last four years of the Ne\v Economic Policy (1925-
1928). 
An even more graphic picture of the aftermath of collectiviza-
tion can be obtained from an examination of livestock data. 
Here one notes that in June 1928, the last year of widespread 
independent farming, there were about 335 million horses in the 
Soviet Union, while immediately following the big collectivization 
drive of 1932-3 their number had declined to 16.6 million, or less 
than half. By 1938, ten years after the end of the NEP, the herd 
had risen to 175 million, or somewhat less than two thirds of the 
1928 figure. Over the same time span the numbers of other live-
stock declined similarly. Cattle fell from 705 million to 38.4 mil-
lion head, or by almost half, between 1928 and 1933, and had only 
climbed to 63.2 million head by 1938. Cows alone declined from 
30.7 million head in 1928 to 19.6 million in 1933 and only regained 
the 25.2-million-head figure in 1938. Sheep and goat herds declined 
by almost two thirds between 1928 and 1933-that is, from 146.7 
million head to 50.2 million-and failed to reach the three-quarter 
mark of the 1928 total even a decade later, when these herds had 
risen to barely 1025 million head. The hog population alone 
bettered its numbers between 1928 and 1938 by rising from 26 
million head to 30.6 million. But even in this case the collectivi-
zation process managed to take a heavy toll, since the 1933 herd 
was well below that of 1928. 
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The great collectivization drive completely changed the face 
of the Soviet Union in a remarkably short period of time. From 
the Communist point of view, this drive was an almost complete 
success: by 1936, over 90 per cent of all households were collec-
tivized and more than 96 per cent of the arable land in the Soviet 
Union was incorporated into collective or state farms. In other 
words, within the short period of seven years the private farmer 
had virtually ceased to exist and the dream of a socialist agriculture 
had been carried into practice. 
But the price of this offering to ideological orthodoxy was 
heavy indeed. It included no less than five million human lives. 
Agricultural production had fallen to levels far below those which 
had prevailed before collectivization was introduced with such 
ruthlessness and on such a large scale. Livestock herds were 
obliterated, and the population-both urban and rural-if it did not 
actually starve to death, was nevertheless compelled to suffer hunger 
and privation for no apparent reason other than that a set of dogmas 
was being put to a practical test. 
It is scarcely surprising, in the light of this terrible experience, 
that Josef Stalin, in an exceptional moment of candor, once con-
fessed to Winston Churchill that the collectivization drive and the 
ensuing agricultural catastrophe had presented the greatest danger 
which the Soviet Union had faced during its existence as the first 
and only independent socialist state. Although Stalin's statement 
was indubitably correct, it is significant that he failed to add an 
explanation of why this danger was faced in the peculiarly abrupt 
and inhuman way in which the Bolsheviks chose to face it, and 
that he did not explain precisely what rewards to the Soviet people 
this decade of sacrifice was supposed to have brought. 
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The Present System 
Although Soviet agricultural institutions have experienced a 
series of minor changes since the end of the great collectivization 
drive of the thirties, the broad outlines of the system have not 
essentiall y changed. What, then, are the characteristic features of 
the Soviet countryside? What are its distinguishing marks? And 
how do these differ from farm institutions in other lands? 
The Collective Farm 
The collective farm, or kolkhoz, is the most typical and wide-
spread of Communist agricultural institutions-a large farm cre-
ated by a merger of individual plots of land, cultivated jointly by 
its members. The land belongs neither to the farmers nor to the 
farm itself, but remains the property of the state, which leases it 
to the kolkhoz. All major tools, utensils, farm buildings, and live-
stock are owned not by individuals but by the collective farm, and 
returns from proceeds are shared by the peasants according to their 
labor input. The individual peasant members of the kolkhoz retain 
title only to their houses, their individual tools, and a small piece 
of land (usually known as a household plot), some poultry, and 
an occasional piece of livestock. * 
In theory, the kolkhoz is a voluntary organization operating on 
democratic principles, administered by a chairman who is elected 
* In the early stages of the Soviet revolution the ideal form of the col-
lective farm was a "commune." Inspired by Fourier's "phalansteries" and 
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by the membership from its own ranks. In practice, the system is 
much more authoritarian. The history of the collectivization drive 
and of the peasants' resistance provides ample and frequently tragic 
proof that the kolkhozes are not, in fact, voluntary associations. 
Similarly, although the formalities of the election process are ob-
served, the chairman is in fact appointed, and is frequently not a 
member of the kolkhoz at all but imported from some other area. 
With increasing frequency he has tended not to be a peasant. * 
Similarly, though the kolkhoz in theory enjoys wide authority 
over its own cultivation program, its plans are in fact dictated by 
the government in the form of quotas of specified crops which the 
kolkhoz is legally obligated to produce and surrender to the gov-
ernment. As a result, the economic life of the kolkhoz, and of its 
members, is not shaped independently at all, but is in reality only 
an expression of the government's policy and specific requirements. 
The kolkhoz is the most common and widespread agricultural 
institution in the Soviet Union, but it has never found great favor 
with either the government or the Communist Party, both of 
which have always considered it no more than a step on the road 
to a truly socialist agricultural enterprise. 
The State Farm 
Although the state farm, or sovkhoz, has never achieved real 
success in the Soviet Union, it is an institution which deserves 
Owen's COmmUnItIeS, these were characterized by joint ownership of aU 
assets, both large and small, and by communal living. These, however, 
proved so highly unpopular, as well as impractical, that they were aban-
doned, together with a much looser form of collective farming known as 
the TOZ, which maintained individual ownership and only stressed com-
munal labor. The institution which is described here, also known as the 
Hartel," has been the only one in existence since the thirties. 
'*' To illustrate this point, it need only be recalled that in 1954, in con-
nection with the virgin lands drive and the corn planting program, fully 
a third of all collective farm chairmen were summarily replaced by Party 
officials from urban areas. 
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considerable attention, if only because it is-in theory at least-
the model of ,,,hat the Soviets think Communist agriculture should 
be. Institutionally, it can be characterized essentially as a nation-
alized agricultural factory. The land, utensils, farm buildings, live-
stock, residential housing-in fact all real or movable property-
belongs to the state.* The peasants working on the state farms are 
paid wages according to the nature of their duties. If the crop or 
livestock plans are not fulfilled, the farm workers may be penalized; 
alternatively, if plans are exceeded the employees receive special 
rewards. The system of remuneration is, in other words, almost 
identical to that in socialized industry. 
The popularity of the sovkhoz among the Soviet leaders is 
easy to explain. The Communists, who profoundly distrust the 
peasant and who believe the institution of private property to be 
inimical to their system, see in the sovkhoz the most convenient 
vehicle for the creation of a rural proletariat. Similarly in early 
years they were deeply fascinated by what they thought to be 
the superior economic efficiency of the large producing unit. The 
state farm, frequently consisting of the lands of former large 
estates, seemed to provide the ideal solution: a mechanized, rural 
factory, amenable to efficient political control. 
But, in practice, the sovkhoz proved to be far from ideal. From 
the beginning, the very size of these sovkhozes involved an ex-
traordinary waste of time and fuel merely to bring men and ma-
chinery to the work sites. Soon afterward it became apparent that 
other costs were also very high, even in comparison with the in-
efficient kolkhozes. Even though an attempt was made to operate 
them like factories, the incentive process could never be made 
to work efficiently on the sovkhozes. For one thing the very 
nature of agriculture renders the formulation and execution 
* It should be noted that all land belongs to the state under Soviet law: 
this is true not only of the land of a collective farm but also of the house-
hold plot. The farmer is entitled to the use of the land, but he may not sell 
or alienate it in any way. 
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of preCIse plans difficult, since the controlled conditions which 
prevail in a factory are impossible. Secondly, the managers of 
these farms were never much interested in achieving spectacular 
successes. They knew that an over-fulfilled plan would bring a 
premium; but this year's extraordinary achievement might easily 
become next year's norm. Thus, a combination of rigid and often 
unrealistic planning, managerial apathy, and shortages of equip-
ment, resulted in frequently exorbitant unit costs, for which the 
government had to pay in the form of subsidies. For these the 
sovkhoz, unlike the kolkhoz, was eligible since it was a state 
institution. 
Given these basic limitations, many of the state farms led 
a brief and precarious existence. The enormous sovkhozes of the 
nineteen thirties were soon condemned, and divided into smaller 
and relatively more efficient kolkhozes. Nevertheless, the essential 
ideas which lie at the root of the sov khozes as units of agricultural 
organization and production have shown remarkable persistence 
-as evidenced by the attempt, in Stalin's last years, to construct a 
number of gigantic "agrocities." The plan called for the consolida-
tion of widely scattered kolkhoz and sovkhoz lands, for the abolition 
of existing living areas and their amalgamation into new and larger 
"rural towns," for the centralization of communal services, and, 
implicitly, for the intensification of controls. 
This program once again proved to be short-lived. The inevi-
table dislocations which it would have entailed threatened a degree 
of chaos in production which the Soviet Union could not afford, 
and the chronic shortages of building material from which the 
Soviet Union has always suffered made any plan which called 
for the construction of residential dwellings and communal build-
ings for several million people totally impracticable. 
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that even this failure has finally 
led to the abandonment of the ideas which apparently inspired it. 
On the contrary: the struggle between ideology and experience sti] 1 
seems very much alive, as shown by the fact that the recently 
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In 1953, when these collective farmers were photographed 30 miles from Moscow, Khrushchev informed the Party of serious 
failures in the agricultural system: continuing machinery shortages, poor crop yields, and depressed standards of living. 
In order to raise Soviet production of grain, settlers like these of the 1930's are being urged to grow wheat on the remote 
"virgin lands" of Siberia. The government has offered them good pay and other benefits but success remains in doubt. 
inaugurated drive to settle the "virgin lands" in the interior of the 
Soviet Union has once again been assigned by the state and the 
Party to a number of newly created state farms. 
The Machine Tractor Stations 
A third and equally basic feature of the Russian countryside 
is the machine tractor station (MTS). This institution plays a 
double role in Soviet agricultural economics. Its ostensible purpose 
is to serve as a central pool of machinery for use by the collective 
farms of a given district, but this is by no means its only function. 
It is in addition, a major crop-collecting agency, and as such 
operates as one of the chief and most powerful instruments of 
state control in the countryside. 
The first of the MTS were organized in 1930 to furnish the 
swiftly growing number of collective farms with machinery. This 
particular course was chosen in part at least because the govern-
ment lacked the farm machinery to equip the individual kolkhozes, 
but it is doubtful that this was the chief reason even at the begin-
ning of the collectivization drive. Ownership and control of ma-
chinery would have given the collectives too dangerous a measure 
of independence from the government and Party. Hence, as the 
supplies of machinery gradually increased they were turned over 
to more and larger MTS, which in turn acquired the characteristics 
of permanent institutions. 
As the agency controlling the bulk of all farm machinery, the 
MTS came to perform most of the mechanical work connected with 
farm production, including such essential processes as plowing, 
harrowing, harvesting, threshing, and other related activities. For 
these services, each of the stations is paid not cash, but a portion 
of the crop which it helps to harvest, the exact fee being determined 
by an elaborate schedule. While the MTS are state institutions, 
their personnel are not entirely on the state's payroll. Tractor 
drivers and other machine operators, for example, are paid directly 
by the collective farm, while only the managerial staff, always 
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including a political officer, are directly employed by the 
government. 
Although the contract between a collective farm and its MTS is 
theoretically based on the equality of both parties, the latter is 
actually in a much stronger bargaining position. From a political 
viewpoint, the MTS is one of the chief emissaries of the central 
government in the countryside; and in the Soviet Union the central 
government is always likely to inspire a measure of deference and 
fear. Again, because it is the sole custodian of all-important ma-
chinery, it is apparent to both parties that no collective farm can 
gather its harvest, meet its obligatory delivery quotas, or feed its 
members without the equipment which the MTS disposes. As a 
result, and quite apart from the tenets of Soviet theory, the 
kolkhoz finds itself in an inferior position, . and this the MTS 
usually exploits, either with or without official sanction. Since the 
MTS almost always service more than one kolkhoz and since the 
MTS are, in any case, usually behind schedule (by reason of me-
chanical breakdowns, shortages of spare parts, or faulty work 
organization) they are clearly in a position to decide which kolkhoz 
shall be serviced first. Or again, by seeking the necessary adjust-
ment of payment schedules, the MTS in practice are able to dictate 
what a collective farm can and cannot sow, by claiming to be 
able to harvest only those crops which are most profitable to them-
selves and coincidentally most useful to the state.* 
Thus it is fair to say that the network of MTS is not only the 
third but also the pivotal instrument characterizing Soviet agricul-
tural institutions, at least insofar as the MTS system is able to exert 
a decisive influence on the operations and on the ultimate successes 
which the other two can achieve. 
* Under the complex accounting devices which characterize all Soviet 
economic activity, certain types of work are judged to be more profitable 
than others, even though they may not be more arduous or more useful 
socially. 
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State Procurements and Peasant Incomes 
The system just described is designed to extract a maximum of 
produce from the countryside. Its primary purpose is not to further 
output or to increase peasant incomes, but rather to guarantee a 
regular flow of grain and other agricultural commodities to state 
warehouses. This, it should be noted, it done not only through the 
instrumentality of the MTS, whose share of each year's crops 
constitutes the state's largest single source of agricultural prod-
ucts;* in addition, the state regularly imposes a set of delivery 
quotas which each of the collective farms is legally obligated to 
meet in full, regardless of weather conditions, crop yield, or the 
quality and quantity of the harvest. 
The specific amounts to be delivered to the state depend on the 
type of crop, the size and location of the farm, and, of course, 
on the current needs of the state. They are, in other words, fixed 
amounts determined in advance, and never a percentage of the 
harvested crop. It necessarily follows that when the needs of the 
state are high and the harvest poor, these fixed and inescapable 
obligations impose a severe hardship on the peasants, both in-
dividually and collectively.** 
In theory, at least, this might have left the peasant with no 
income whatever, except for his share of the receipts which the 
state pays to each collective farm for the collection of its crop. In 
:II: As an example, the figures for 1939-40 show that 19 per cent of the 
grain crop was handed over as payment to the MTS, while only 14 per cent 
was delivered directly to the state in the form of compulsory deliveries. 
This total of 33 per cent of the crop must then be compared with the 
share which the state in turn distributed to the peasants, which accounted 
for only 23 per cent of the crop, Izvestia, Moscow, March 29, 1941. 
:11::11: The rigidity of the system is such that if, for any reason, a kolkhoz 
cannot meet its assigned quotas from the current harvest or its own reserves, 
it is forced to purchase the amount of its deficit on the free market and at 
considerable cost. 
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better years this base income is, of course, supplemented by a 
division of the residual produce of each kolkhoz to its membership, 
carried out according to a complex and variable accounting system. 
Under this system, the kolkhoz member is paid either in cash 
or in kind, depending on the amount of labor he had performed 
on behalf of the collective farm. The accounting unit used to deter-
mine that amount is the "labor day," the value of which varies 
with the nature of the work involved and the length of time spent 
in the performance of a given task. * The number of labor days 
accumulated by a peasant determines his share of the collective 
farm's income, after legal obligations to the state are met. 
In the early days of collectivization these two were virtually the 
only sources of the peasant's income. In practice, however, it soon 
became clear that so rigid a system was unworkable, since it 
provided little or no incentive to cultivate the soil. Over time, there-
fore, several concessions were made to the kolkhoz memberships. 
First, the individual peasant was allowed a small private plot of his 
own and granted permission to keep a rigidly limited number of 
Ii vestock on it. ** Secondly, the kolkhozes were conceded the pri vi-
lege of operating so-called collective farm markets, to which the 
kolkhoz as a whole and its individual members were permitted 
to bring the produce which remained after all obligations to the 
state had been met. Prices in this market were determined by the 
relationship of supply and demand, and were as a rule considerably 
higher than those paid by the state for compulsory deliveries. 
These added incentives, however, quite naturally tended to 
produce results of which the state and Party could not possibly 
approve. The collective farmers began to spend increasing amounts 
of time on their private plots instead of the collective farm land. 
:II: For example, one day's work performed by a combine operator or senior 
tractor driver is worth two "labor days," while that same day's work spent 
as a cleaning woman is worth only one half a "labor day." 
:11::11: The size of these plots and the number and kinds of animals varied 
from region to region, and also changed with the passage of time. 
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They learned almost immediately that time and effort spent on 
the household plot were infinitely more remunerative than any 
they could devote to the cultivation of collective land. The govern-
ment's response to this intensely human development was to in-
troduce a mandatory minimum number of labor days for each 
member of a collective farm. Any member who did not spend 
this prescribed number of labor days on the lands of the kolkhoz 
became subject to expulsion. Even though membership in a col-
lective farm has always been far from popular in the Soviet Union, 
such an expulsion nonetheless constitutes a serious threat to any 
farmer. Inevitably, the expulsion of anyone member of a collec-
tivized household results in a loss of family earnings. In more 
extreme cases, involving heads of households and their families, it 
means that the individuals concerned have simply forfeited all 
possibilities of earning their living in the countryside, for the ob-
vious reasons that they have lost their share of the land and the 
cattle, and that private and independent farming has disappeared 
from the Soviet countryside. 
Another and even less desirable effect of concessions to the profit 
motive was an attempt by the peasantry to expand-usually in an 
illicit way-the size of their private plots. This occurred on a 
particularly ominous scale during World War II when, as a result 
of confusion and an inevitable relaxation of supervision, millions 
of acres of collectivized land simply "disappeared," and found their 
way into household plots. 
At the war's end the Soviet government was, of course, able 
to re-establish its system of controls and to recover the "lost" lands; 
but it was hardly able to obliterate the peasant's desire to rid him-
self of the restraints imposed by the collectivization system. Soviet 
farmers have not, as some East European peasants still do, the 
alternative of escaping from a system of collectivized agriculture. 
Even so, they still show their resentment by employing every possi-
ble means to evade the exactions of the state and to assert their 
right to private initiative. 
47 
In the period following Stalin's death, the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union has felt obliged to show greater consideration 
to the peasantry than in many years. Once again it has introduced 
a number of concessions, even though these are only adjustments 
rather than fundamental changes of the system. The innovations 
have included price increases on the crops which are delivered to 
the government, either in the form of compulsory deliveries or 
voluntary sales;* a reduction in the quotas themselves; and the 
lowering, or elimination, of the special taxes paid on private plots. 
Nevertheless, after a span of 40 years the basic features of the 
system remain substantially unchanged. The collective farm and 
the MTS are still the twin pillars of Soviet agriculture; the bulk of 
the harvest still goes to the state rather than to the peasant. Rigid 
ideological and governmental controls over the peasantry have been 
retained, so that the farmer still has no power to determine what 
he will produce, how he will produce it, and to whom he may sell.** 
This, in broad outline, is the agricultural system which, after 
decades of development in the USSR, has been exported to, and 
imposed on, those nations of Eastern Europe and Asia in which 
Communism has gained political control during the past 10 years. 
It now remains to assess the results which that system has achieved. 
'*' After fulfilling its compulsory delivery quotas the kolkhoz can sell its 
remaining produce to the state instead of on the collective farm market. 
The prices which are paid are well above those paid for compulsory de-
liveries, even though they are still below free market price levels. There 
are certain incentives for selling directly to the state, including more favor-
able credit terms, special discounts on industrial products, and several others. 
'*' '*' An illustration of the inherently authoritarian and involuntary char-
acter of Soviet agricultural institutions is provided in the corn growing 
campaign which was launched at the behest of Party Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev in 1954. Once the decision to expand corn production had 
been made in the inner circles of the government and Party, it appears 
that some 60 million hectares of corn were immediately planted on Soviet 
collective farms, in an unparalleled burst of "spontaneity" which required 
no orders from the higher authorities. 
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TABLE .ill 
THE COST OF SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION 
MILLION TONS MILLION HEAD MILLION HEAD 






GRAIN PRODUCTION HORSES CATTLE 
Within four years of the inauguration of Stalin's First Five Year Plan, Soviet agriculture 
suffered a series of dramatic setbacks. The recovery and gains which had been achieved 
under N.E.P. were wiped out. The production of grain and livestock dropped to 
the levels which had prevailed during the worst days of the civil war. Ten years after the 
introduction of the First Five Year Plan, the damage had not been repaired. 
Note: Both the 1932 and 1938 grain crop figures are estimates. Grain 
yields for the former year have never been established with exacti-
tude because of the Soviet Government's continued reluctance 
to issue reliable statistics. The figure for 1938 has been adjusted 
to compensate for the upward bias which is imparted by the use 
of "biological yield" measures in official Soviet tabulations. 
Sources: Sofsialisticheskoe Stroifel'stvo, Moscow, 1936 and Sotsialisticheskoe 
Selskoe Khoziaistvo, Moscow. 1939 
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The Results 
To determine whether a policy has been a success depends, 
to a large degree, on our criteria. Clearly, a policy may be bril-
iantly successful according to one set of values and a dismal failure 
according to another. In the case of an agricultural policy the 
usual tests are relatively obvious, and normally include the measure-
ment first of production, then of the income of the producer. The 
first criterion is probably the more self-evident, since there is no 
sphere of economic activity in which the product is more directly 
useful to humanity. The second criterion is also rather simple, 
because, if most economic activity is motivated by a desire for 
gain, then in all but totally self-sufficient communities, production 
is undertaken with a view to increasing the individual's real income 
through trade. As a rule, moreover, these two criteria are com-
plementary: if production is higher, so is the income of the 
producer.* 
These criteria, because of their universal applicability, can also 
be used in making an assessment of the results achieved by the 
agricultural policies of the Soviet Union. Yet lest it be claimed by 
apologists of the Soviet system that Communist policy objectives 
* Exceptions to this general rule do, of course, exist. Increased produc-
tion may, by lowering prices, reduce income, a result which in fact was the 
case in most European countries during the 30's. Nor was the Soviet Union 
entirely immune from this characteristic of depression: the fall in world 
prices forced it to increase its exports to maintain income from foreign 
trade. 
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Khrushchev has promised that the Soviet Union will surpass American production of meat, milk, and butter by 1960. To help 
achieve this goal, a delegation of Soviet experts vj~ited the U .S. in 1955, shown here studying American farming techniques. 

in agriculture have always been primarily social and political rather 
than purely economic in character, an attempt will also be made 
to see just how well the Soviets have fared in pursuit of these 
essentially non-economic objectives. 
Agricultural Production 
What, then, is the production record achieved in the USSR 
over four decades? And, perhaps even more significantly, what is 
the record in the East European People's Democracies after almost 
ten full years of concerted effort to pattern their own institutions 
on the Soviet model, applying the lessons of Soviet experience? 
Such a combined survey may certainly be expected to have con-
siderable bearing on the question of the efficiency of Soviet agricul-
tural methods. 
In 1956, largely as a result of sudden expansion of grain lands 
in Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union produced some 130 million metric 
tons of grain, while before the revolution the average annual crop 
for the years 1909-1913 was in the vicinity of 82 million tons. On 
the face of it this appears to be an almost spectacular increase. 
The reason, of course, lies in the fact that 1956 was, in many 
respects, an exceptional year. The average for the last five years, on 
the other hand, when compared with the pre-revolutionary figures, 
presents a more realistic and also much less impressive picture.* 
Thus, average grain production over the period 1950-1956 was about 
101 million metric tons annually, which represents a 30 per cent 
average increase over the pre-revolutionary period. Even this, how-
ever, may be regarded as a fairly impressive gain until account is 
taken of the population increase which took place in the Soviet 
Union in the meantime. Czarist Russia, immediately preceding 
'*' Since agricultural production is always subject to a number of unpredicta-
ble elements, averages over a period of years give a more reliable measure 
than the data for any given year can do. 
Despite many promises of a better life which the Soviet rulers 
have made to the Russian peasant, his life has not improved 
A appreciably over the past four decades. Farmers, like this one 
\J photographed in 1954, have paid the price, but have failed 
to reap the benefits of rapid industrialization in the USSR. 
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World War I, had a population of some 138 mll110n, while the 
Soviet Union today-within a land area roughly comparable-has 
a population slightly in excess of the 200 million mark. This 45 per 
cent increase in population will be seen to be not only well in 
excess of the grain output, but in fact half again as high. Moreover, 
even if it is assumed that the USSR will henceforth be able to main-
tain an average annual grain production of about 130 million tons, 
which there are grounds to doubt, this 58 per cent increase in out-
put would still not be much in excess of the population increase. 
Hence, when seen in this context, it may fairly be said that Soviet 
grain production has failed to register impressive gains, and that 
it is in fact doubtful whether the Russian consumer of 1957 is 
eating more or better bread than he might have in 1913. 
The growth of the livestock population has also been less than 
remarkable. In 1916, the last pre-revolutionary census year, Czarist 
Russia possessed approximately 60.3 million head of cattle, of which 
some 26 million were cows. The increase for cattle in general is on 
the order of 17 per cent, and that of cows somewhat higher. Once 
again both are well below the Soviet population increase. Admit-
tedly, the quality and yields of the livestock have improved. 
Whereas the average annual yield of milk per cow was about 
1000 kilograms in pre-revolutionary days, it had risen to about 1550 
kilograms per cow on collective farms by 1956. Yet even this im-
provement reflects the generally poor level of Soviet livestock herds. 
The 1550 kilogram yield on collective farms is only about two 
thirds that of the 2400 kilogram yields achieved on the state farms 
in 1956 which, although they are the highest in the Soviet Union, 
still remain well below the milk yields of other countries. * 
It is, of course, beyond doubt that the Soviet Union has made 
considerable progress over the Czarist Russia of 40 years ago. 
Yet one cannot lose sight of the fact that the agriculture of pre-
'*' As cows on state farms accounted for about six per cent of the total 
in 1956, the national average milk production in the USSR was roughly 
1650 liters. These figures, to become meaningful, must be compared with the 
yields achieved in other representative countries such as the United States, 
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revolutionary Russia was retarded and relatively unproductive 
w hen compared with the agricultural systems of Western Europe. 
In fact it is fair to say that only the large landed estates used to 
produce with any degree of efficiency, while the mass of the 
peasantry was engaged in sub-standard cultivation, employing both 
tools and manpower with far less skill and efficiency than elsewhere 
in Europe. The February and October revolutions of 1917, the spon-
taneous division of the land, and a series of peasant uprisings pro-
vide ample evidence of the low standards of pre-revolutionary agri-
culture. Given this historical background, it can hardly be unjust 
to say that agriculture in general, and particularly the attainment 
of increased production levels, should have been the very first 
concern of the Soviet government. The fact that even over a period 
of four decades it has failed to achieve an increase in the produc-
tion rate commensurate with population growth cannot be ex-
plained merely by reference to political or ideological considera-
tions. Whatever these considerations may have been, and whether 
they are or are not laudable, the actual results testify to the system's 
lack of flexibility and its apparent inability to provide an adequate 
food base for precisely that socialist society which the Soviet leaders 
have been ready to exalt. 
The Soviet regime seems to be well aware of the failure of 
agriculture to match either its own industrial development or 
the agricultural development of other industrialized nations. The 
"virgin lands" program which was launched with much fanfare 
in 1954 is perhaps the best proof of this awareness. During that year 
some 18.5 million hectares of previously fallow land were sown to 
grain, and by late 1956 the extent of the newly planted area had 
risen to over 35 million hectares. Most of this land is in Siberia 
and Kazakhstan, both of which are poor in moisture, and although 
the project has yielded a good first harvest it represents a dramatic 
2500 kilograms; United Kingdom, 2900 kilograms; West Germany, 2900 
kilograms; and France, 2050 kilograms. In countries which specialize in 
livestock production yields are higher still-for instance, in Switzerland, 
3150 kilograms, and Denmark, 3560 kilograms. 
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and uncertain gamble. The areas in question are far from normal 
transportation channels, have few roads, no established communi-
ties, and as of this date virtu all y no farm buildings. An initial in-
vestment of considerable magnitude was required merely to open 
the area to cultivation. Now, enormous expenditures are necessary 
to settle the new sovkhozes, to equip them with still scarce farm 
machinery, to build the necessary grain storage facilities, and finally 
to transport grain to the consuming areas. Under any circumstances, 
a government would hesitate to embark on such a venture unless 
it desperately needed grain, and unless it were willing to take con-
siderable risks to get it. 
Whether, in fact, the risks which have been taken will justify 
themselves it is too early to say. Only the dangers stand out in 
clear relief. The combination of low rainfall and shallow topsoil 
raises the serious hazard of an enormous dustbowl, which could 
not only destroy the soil of the virgin lands, but also damage 
neighboring areas. Even exceptional rainfall in these areas would 
not eliminate this danger, but merely postpone it! Nor are the 
apparent successes of the past two years a guarantee of long-range 
success. Moisture retention in the waste area appears to be ex-
tremely low. This becomes a highly significant fact when it is 
recalled that parts of the so-called virgin lands had actually been 
put under cultivation in the early thirties only to be left fallow 
in later years. The yields obtained on these lands have been 
substantially lower than those achieved on genuinely virgin soils. 
This would seem to indicate that even over a time span of 20 
years the soils of Kazakhstan and Siberia have not succeeded in 
accumulating or retaining enough moisture to produce an eco-
nomically justifiable yield. This experience may very well repeat 
itself in the future. Grain yields may fall off sharply after two or 
three more harvests because of the declining moisture content of the 
soil. If this should happen, the entire region will have to be rested 
for an indeterminate time, whereafter it mayor may not continue 
to produce at lower yields than at the present. 
Unlike these future risks, however, the heavy investments and 
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dislocations in other agricultural areas brought about by the diver-
sion of machinery, personnel, and fertilizers are real and present 
costs, which will continue to affect the economy even if the produc-
tivity of the virgin lands should fall drastic all y. 
The dangers inherent in the "virgin lands" program are, if 
anything, accentuated by concurrent efforts to introduce corn crops 
on a massive scale in the other and older agricultural regions of the 
USSR. This effort involves the transfer of land currently under 
wheat to corn in view of the latter's greater versatility as against 
Russia's traditional bread grain crops. It also involves a sharp cut-
back in wheat production in most parts of European Russia, the 
introduction of new plowing and cultivation methods, the con-
struction of silage facilities, and the manufacture of large numbers of 
corn cultivators. 
In theory at least, both this and the "virgin lands" grain can 
fill the gap created by the reduction of the older wheat areas. 
If climatic conditions over the next several years are virtually 
ideal, this latest Soviet gamble with its agricultural resources may 
have a chance of real success. Wheat production on marginal land 
will have been substantially expanded, while the anticipated in-
crease in corn production will increase available food supplies not 
only for human but also for livestock consumption. If, however, 
grain production falls below expectations, if poor weather con-
ditions should prevail, or if future corn yields do not meet planned 
target levels, then the whole of the most recent effort to revolu-
tionize Soviet agriculture will be in grave jeopardy. 
From a purely humanitarian point of view, it is certainly to be 
hoped that these programs will meet at least with some measure 
of success, thereby giving the Soviet peasant and consumer in 
general some small feeling of confidence that he has outdistanced 
the perennial dangers of hunger and famine. Yet the fact that 
even this meager gain is still in doubt can only be read as a disas-
trous reflection on both the management and the achievements 
of Soviet agriculture. Where, after 40 years, are the fruits of 
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industrialization and the development of "socialist technology"? 
Why, after almost half a century, are such emergency programs 
and heavy risks still necessary? Wherein lies the alleged superiority 
of a society which has thus far failed to achieve a steady and 
reliable increase in food production, commensurate with population 
growth? 
In the light of the Soviet record, it is not surprising that the 
achievement of socialized agriculture in the East European satellites 
has been far from satisfactory. A brief survey of production in these 
countries will illustrate the point. 
Thus, in Poland, which was a predominantly agrarian country 
before the Communist seizure, agricultural production, far from 
having registered significant progress over the past decade, has 
registered a net decline. According to official Polish sources, the 
grain crop during the five years 1950-1955, including wheat, barley, 
and oats, was only some 85 per cent of the 1934-38 average.* Only 
rye, with a production of 99.8 per cent of pre-war, and sugar 
beets with 109 per cent of pre-war, have either maintained or 
surpassed the 1934-38 average. All others have registered declines 
with barley production, for instance, at barely two thirds of the pre-
war average. 
These losses have not been due to any reduction of the sown 
area. Instead, they are the result of a sharp fall in yields. In fact, 
during the first half of the present decade, grain yields were 
only about 92 per cent of pre-war and potatoes about 85.5 per cent, 
while sugar beets, whose output actually increased during this 
period, only attained 71 per cent of pre-war. This decline both 
in yields and production has not been and cannot be explained in 
terms of climate and all the variables which this term implies. 
Instead, the sources of this failure to maintain, much less develop, 
Polish agriculture must be sought in the general crisis brought on 
by essentially the same errors of judgment and policy which have 
* All comparisons involving pre- and post-war Poland are basea on adjust-
ments to compensate for border changes. 
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characterized Soviet experience: forced collectivization, the sys-
tematic reduction of incentives, excessive and one-sided industrial 
investment, and the varied but persistent forms of persecution 
directed chiefly against the peasantry. 
The situation created by these various factors is also reflected 
in Polish livestock data. The cattle herd in 1955 was only 80 per 
cent of pre-war, and only small livestock, such as sheep, which 
increased by almost 120 per cent, have registered any gains. While 
it is true that World War II destroyed many of Poland's cattle, 
this by no means provides a full explanation for the failure of the 
Polish livestock herd to increase over a 12-year period. Nor has the 
decline been only quantitative; it has been qualitative as well, 
as shown, for instance, by milk yields, which often serve as a 
criterion for the quality of cattle. Here again one finds that 
1955 yields were about 87 per cent of pre-war-a fall from 3,166 
kilograms to 2,743 kilograms per cow.* 
But if the Polish case were an isolated one, it might be con-
sidered an exception. In fact, it is typical of the experience of the 
other states of Eastern Europe. Thus Hungary was also a pre-
dominantly agricultural country before World War II, and a major 
grain exporter. More recently it has been forced into the position 
of a grain importer. In 1955, the year before the October revolt, 
Hungarian wheat production was 97 per cent of pre-war, rye 
production 76 per cent, and oat production 62 per cent. Gains were 
registered only in barley, corn, and some technical crops. Livestock 
herds declined as they did elsewhere in the area. The cattle herd 
in 1956 was 94 per cent of pre-war, horses numbered some 82 per 
cent, while only sheep and hogs registered gains. 
In Czechoslovakia (which differs from the other Soviet satellites 
in that it alone was not a predominantly agricultural country when 
the Communists achieved power) the pattern tends nevertheless 
* It is significant to note how much higher these yields are than those 
which have been achieved by the best herds in the USSR at the best 
of times. 
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to repeat itself. The production of cereals in 1956, the best year 
since 1948, was still below the 1934-38 average. Potato production 
in 1956 was only about 92 per cent of the pre-war average, while 
the output of sugar beets had remained stationary.* Thus, although 
agricultural production in general has not suffered a spectacular 
decline, it has also failed to register any improvement-in spite of 
the fact that the mechanization of agriculture was well advanced 
before the 1948 coup d'etat, and that the Communists in Czecho-
slovakia inherited a well developed industrial plant whose subse-
quent expansion presented different and rather lesser problems than 
those encountered in the attempt to industrialize predominantly 
rural economies. This also despite the fact that war-time damages 
to the Czechoslovak economy in general, and therefore its agricul-
ture as well, was certainly less than that suffered by its neighbors. 
Unfortunately, the Bulgarian and Romanian governments have 
not published data comparable to those furnished by other Com-
munist countries. It may be assumed, however, that had their 
achievements been more impressive than their neighbors' they 
would not have hesitated to make them known. 
This review of developments in the Soviet Union and the 
East European satellites (which might easily be extended to 
Yugoslavia, which occupies an almost unique position in the com-
munity of Communist states) cannot fail to lead an impartial 
observer to the conclusion that "socialist" agriculture as developed 
in these states has not succeeded in increasing production, and has 
therefore not contributed to raising the consumption levels of the 
populations concerned. Certainly in the Soviet Union, it is doubt-
ful that the average of all agricultural production has kept pace 
with the average rate of population increase. After forty years 
of trial and error, advance and retreat, the Soviet government must 
:II: Czechoslovak livestock production has shown a similar pattern of devel-
opment. In 1956 the cattle herd had reached 96 per cent of pre-war, while 
cows numbered some 85 per cent of the pre-war herd, and only pigs and 






GRAIN PRODUCTION AND POPULATION GROWTH 
IN THE U.S.S.R.: 1917 - 1957 
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_ GRAIN 
~ POPULATION 
1917 1927 1937 1947 
The population of the Soviet Union has registered a steady and relatively rapid 
increase since the Revolution of 1917. The rate of growth was not a ppreciably slowed 
by the civil war {1918-1920}, the great famine (1932-33) or the second World War. 
Grain production, on the other hand, has been uneven. It has increased only about 
35 per cent as against a 44 per cent population increase during a 4O-year period. 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that grain production in 1917 was greater than in 
1947 and that production in 1957 had only registered a 12.4 per cent increase over 
the admittedly excellent harvest of 1937. 
Note: Wherever possible, population and output data refer to the same 
year. In some cases, however, it was necessary to use different years. 
Thus, 1917 data refers to the '913 census year; the 1927 population 
figure is adjusted from the 1926 census year; the 1937 figure is 
derived from the 1939 census. The figures for 1957 are estimates. 
SQurces: Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo, Moscow, 1936, Sotsialisticheskoe Se/-
doe Khoziaistvo, Moscow, 1939, and Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR, 
Moscow, 1956 
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still resort to emergency measures, while the economy as a whole 
remains in a state of serious imbalance. The very effort which is now 
under way to reshape agricultural production patterns, and thus to 
create economic institutions which will provide an adequate food 
base for the Soviet population, is itself the most eloquent admission 
possible that four decades of Communist agricultural policy have 
resul ted in failure. 
This fact is illustrated once again, and if possible with even 
greater clarity, by an examination of the East European scene. 
There, agricultural production has not only failed to keep pace 
with industrial expansion and demand; it has fallen far behind 
both with the result that East European agricultural production 
today is lower than it was before the Communist seizure of power. 
Even though it may be argued that some parts of East and Central 
Europe did sustain heavy losses during World War II, and that they 
have had little more than a decade to effect recovery, it is still very 
doubtful whether this has any bearing on the present situation. 
Recovery patterns in other parts of Europe, and indeed the world, 
indicate that it does not, and that the real explanation must be 
sought in the character of Communist agricultural institutions, 
which have consistently failed to produce adequate, not to mention 
impressive, results over much longer spans of time. 
Peasant Income 
The production record of Soviet and satellite agriculture would 
leave few grounds on which to suppose that peasant incomes in 
the Communist orbit have risen while output has fallen or re-
mained stationary. Logically, one would be led to expect the oppo-
site. Yet, it is far from easy to support logical inference with factual 
data. 
The Soviet Union, for instance, has not published standard of 
living data, retail price indices, or family budgets for over 27 
years; and the People's Democracies, with the possible exception 
of Poland, have hardly published more. Nevertheless, though the 
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available information is necessarily fragmentary it is possible to 
form a meaningful picture of peasant income. 
As noted above, the kolkhoz farmer generally derives his in-
come from two sources: (1) his share of the net kolkhoz in-
come calculated according to the number of "labor days" which he 
has accumulated; and (2) receipts from the sales of produce raised 
on his household plot. The recent publication of pertinent data 
in a number of Soviet journals makes possible an approximate cal-
culation of the amounts of cash and produce which the peasant 
can expect from these two sources of income. * The data suggest 
that annual receipts of about 257,000,000 rubles went to each of ap-
proximatel y 1250 kolkhozes of Moscow province in 1956. It is also 
known that some 87,000,000 labor days were credited to the kolkhoz 
members of this province during that year, from which it follows 
that the value of one "labor day" is rated at approximately 3.70 
rubles. If it is then assumed that the average kolkhoz peasant earns 
approximately 350 "labor days" per year, his annual cash income 
from the collective farm would be in the vicinity of 1300 rubles 
per year. ** In addition to this, the same peasant receives 1.22 kilo-
grams of grain per labor day, which makes a total of about 425 
kilograms annually. In theory, at least, he may sell this amount on 
the collective farm market, but it is most unlikely that he would 
do this with all or even most of it since graIn is a staple item of the 
Russian diet whose per capita consumption is in the neighborhood 
of 250 kilograms per annum. If it is further assumed that not 
all the members of a kolkhoz household earn the same number of 
"labor days," and indeed that some of them earn none at all, it can 
then be safely assumed that most of the grain received is actually 
consumed by the peasant and his fa mil y rather than put up for 
sale. 
:II: Voprosy Ekonomiki} Moscow, Nov. 6, 1956 and Pravda} Moscow, February 
2, 1957. 
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Table IV shows that the total Soviet livestock herd was substantially the same in 1955 
(the latest census year) as it had been in 1917. Even more significantly, the figures 
reveal that it had been much higher in 1927 than it was in 1955. Hogs alone have 
registered a net gain over both J 917 and J 927, but even this advance is far from 
commensurate with population growth during the same period of time. 
Note I: 1919 data have been adjusted for the present boundar.ies of the 
U.S.S.R. 
Note 2: In 1953, the Soviet government shifted the date of its official live· 
stock count from January I to October I. Since figures are 
available for both dates in the year "1953 it has been possible to 
adjust t he 1955 data accordingly by employing the January.October 
ratios for 1953. This may, of course, result in a margin of error, buf 
a margin which is so small that .it would not significantly alter the 
results which are reported in this tabulation. 
Sources: Narodnoe Khoz;o;styO SSSR , Moscow, 1956 
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TABLE :iI 
THE IMPACT OF SOVIETIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: 
AVERAGE OUTPUT OF SELECTED CROPS IN POLAND 




GRAIN POTATOES SUGAR BEETS 
Although the Communist government of Poland achieved some gains under its Six Year 
Plan (1950 - 1955 incl.) over the post-war low of 1946-7, it will be seen that grain a.nd 
potato production remain well below the level of the 1930's and that the gain in 
sugar beet production is ·very modest indeed. 
Note: Production figures given in this table have been adjusted in the 
light of post-war frontier changes. 
Source: Rocznilc Statystyczny, Warsaw, 1956 
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To place the figure of 1300 rubles in proper perspective a 
number of factors must be taken into consideration. The first 
of these is that the cost of everyday necessities is quite high. A kilo-
gram of sugar, for instance, which the kolkhoz farmer cannot 
grow himself, cost 11 rubles, a kilogram of fresh fish 8 rubles, and a 
kilogram of tea no less than 68 rubles in 1956.* 
It should also be remembered that, quite apart from semi-
luxuries like tea, the average kolkhoz member does not auto-
matically receive all basic foodstuffs from the collective farm. Thus, 
a grain farm is likely to distribute no meat in return for the peas-
ants' "labor day" units, while a dairy farm will not distribute grain. 
In either event, the peasant is compelled to buy a basic item in his 
diet, whether it be meat or bread, on the market and for cash. From 
whatever is left after these inescapable purchases, he must meet his 
tax obligations, buy clothing, and meet the costs of educating his 
children before he can even begin to think of spending on manu-
factured consumer goods. ** 
No information is available on the actual extent of peasant 
earnings resulting from the sale of produce grown on the house-
hold plot. There can be little doubt, however, that these vary 
considerably even within the relatively narrow limits imposed by 
the restricted size of these plots and the fact that, even under 
the best of circumstances, the peasant is unlikely to be able to de-
vote full time to the care of his own plot. In any event, it may be 
assumed that few if any peasants either can or even wish to sell 
all that they are able to grow. Depending on their individual 
circumstances, and the specific nature of the kolkhoz in which 
they are enrolled, it is more likely that, precisely because of their 
'*' Prices from Komsomolskaia Pravda, Moscow, February 22, 1957. 
'*' '*' The cash income used in the above calculations and estimates is that 
for the year 1956. It is, in other words, the income which ensued after 
the enactment of far-reaching reforms which followed Stalin's death in 
1953. Prior to that year, the cash income of kolkhoz peasants was about 
one sixth of the present amount. Current figures are based on V oprosi 
Ekonomiki, Ope cit. 
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low income from other sources, they would prefer to supplement 
their most basic needs directly from the plot itself. Yet, whatever 
his choice actually turns out to be, it is scarcely surprising that 
almost every kolkhoz member spends as much time as he can 
possibly afford on his private plot. Whether it is money that he 
needs, or food, or both, he clearly fails to get enough of them 
for his labor on the collective farm. 
It will be recalled that this discussion of the results which 
socialist agriculture has achieved was undertaken in the light of 
two widely accepted criteria appropriate to a judgment of success 
and failure in agricultural policy. In the light of our analysis it is 
now possible to draw some conclusions. 
First, it would appear that the Communist agricultural system 
has not succeeded in increasing production adequately to meet 
the needs of rising demand. Even in the Soviet Union such progress 
as has been registered over a period of 40 years failed to ensure 
an adequate food base for the population. In the countries of Eastern 
Europe, which theoretically should have benefited from Soviet ex-
perience and hence avoided its errors, production has actually 
registered a net decline. Even though, as we have said, the agricul-
tures of most of these countries were ravaged by war, it is difficult 
to interpret this decline otherwise than by reference to the system 
itself-for their industries were also damaged and still have 
shown a much more ra pid rate of growth. Nor were the Com-
munist countries the only ones to suffer war damage, and yet the 
agricultures of other European countries are at higher levels today 
than they were before 1939. It is, therefore, to the political philoso-
phy of Communism and to its economic policies and institutions 
that one must turn to understand the roots of agricultural failure 
in the Soviet world. 
We must also conclude that, apart from production as such, 
the Communist system has failed to better the lot of the average 
peasant. Even if the Soviet peasant of today is somewhat richer 
than his pre-revolutionary ancestors, it must be remembered that 
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the Russian peasant was very poorly off indeed before 1917. 
As to the peasantry of Eastern Europe, little doubt is possible that 
their present lot is materially worse than it was 20 years ago. 
The Political Consequences oj Collectivization 
It remains to assess the collectivization of agriculture in terms 
of the political criteria which Communists themselves are most 
likely to apply-to test the results in terms of ideology and the 
desire to effect a transformation of society. The characteristic 
outlook of the Bolsheviks and their latter day descendants renders 
it entirely conceivable that they be ready to admit that the peasant 
and agriculture as a whole have suffered over the p::tst four decades, 
that these losses had been far outweighed by other and more sig-
nificant successes. To what extent, one may ask, would this asser-
tion be correct. 
It is certainly true that, in the Soviet Union and to a lesser 
extent in the People's Democracies, the entire face of the country-
side has been transformed. Private ownership of land has been 
abolished and the whole nature of peasant life has changed within 
a remarkably short period. The cost, as we have seen, has been 
enormous, not only to the peasant himself but to the community 
at large. Yet more significantly, even in the Soviet Union there is 
still no "rural proletariat" and there are no "rural factories." The 
peasant has acquiesced, but has not given his support to the new 
system. His attachment to the household plot and relative dislike 
of the collective farm shows him to be still very far from the 
doctrinaire's concept of a "socialist" man. 
The peasant's unwillingness, and inability, to accept both the 
outward forms and essential implications of socialist agriculture as 
understood by contemporary Communists is illustrated even more 
dramatically in the People's Democracies. Only Bulgaria has suc-
ceeded in expanding the collective land area to include a ma-
jority of the arable land. In all the others, collectivization has 
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met with the stubbornest possible resistance. In Czechoslovakia, 
after a peak 38 per cent of the agricultural land had been collec-
tivized in 1953,* there was a decline of 32 per cent in 1956, despite 
the regime's strenuous efforts to prevent an exodus from the 
kolkhozes. In Hungary the reversal has been even greater as the 
share of arable land in collective farms declined from a peak of 
28 per cent in June 1953 to 16 per cent in 1955. After the revolt 
of October 1956 the decline was even sharper with the result that, 
at the present time, probably less than ten per cent of Hungarian 
arable land remains collectivized. In Poland, the Communist regime 
never succeeded in incorporating more than ten per cent of the 
arable land into the collective sector, a result which was only 
achieved after laborious effort in 1953. Yet, even this unimposing 
edifice fell like a house of cards following the events which re-
turned Wladislaw Gomulka to power in October 1956. By early 
1957 less than two per cent of the land remained in the collective 
sector. Finally the Romanian collectivization program, while it 
shows none of the fluctuations which characterize those of other 
countries, has simply failed to grow at all. By the end of 1956 
no more than nine per cent of the arable land had been collectivized 
and there are no indications that this situation will change sig-
nificantly in the foreseeable future. 
This is not a picture which is likely to convince the impartial 
observer that the Communists have succeeded in effecting either a 
deep or lasting change in the hearts and minds of the peasantry. Ex-
cept in the Soviet Union, they have not even achieved submission. 
The peasant of the Communist world has been subjected to every 
form of pressure and compulsion, and where he has yielded, he 
has done so of necessity and not of conviction. To speak of any 
political, psychological, or ideological victory on the Communists' 
part is, therefore, no more than an illusion. In the countryside, there 
has simply been no movement or inclination to espouse the Marxist 
* Agricultural land is a broader concept than arable land and includes forests, 
roads, etc. rather than merely cultivable plowland. 
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outlook. The kolkhoz and the sovkhoz have been brought into 
being, but they remain shells without genuine substance. They are 
organizations without a cohesion of their own which, in the final 
analysis, can be sustained only by the actual, or implied, use 
of force. 
Nor have the Communists even succeeded in organizing these 
external forms of agriculture to their own satisfaction. Agricul-
ture as it exists in the Soviet Union today, after 40 years of develop-
ment, is only a compromise structure which satisfies neither the 
government nor the peasantry. Its form can hardly satisfy the 
ideal Marxist pattern since, from a theoretical viewpoint, it is far 
from perfect. It has none of the health traditionally associated with 




It can be argued that no industrial development takes place 
without a measure of sacrifice and that the process has always in-
volved a necessary degree of social dislocation. Similarly, responsible 
economists will agree that large-scale investment programs, espe-
ciall y when wholly or partially financed from domestic resources, 
are likely to result in a temporary reduction in consumption and 
in the rate of investment which can be allowed for agriculture. 
Let us agree, then, that industrialization-wherever carried out 
-requires self-restraint and even abnegation on the part of the 
mass of citizens. Yet it is a reasonable, as well as vital, question to 
ask how much self-denial need be endured, and for how long a 
period of time. It is precisely this question which the Communists 
have been unwilling to ask or to answer. It has not been a matter 
with them of simply reducing the level of agricultural investment 
for a limited period, and thus of suiting the means to the end. 
Instead, they have actually diminished the capital s~ock of agricul-
ture. They have not only slowed the rate of growth in that sector 
of the economy; wherever they have seized power, and retained it, 
there has been an actual and demonstrable retrogression. 
The record of Communist agriculture over the last four decades 
shows that the Soviets and their satellites have not incurred the 
penalties of dislocation in the interest of speedy and efficient re-
construction. Instead, their policies seem to have been designed 
to perpetuate and even to institutionalize the dislocation of a 
large and vitally important sector of the population. 
It would be foolish to question the scientific and industrial gains 
of the Soviet Union. Some of them have been truly astonishing and 
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of far-reaching importance. But precisely because there is an ad-
vanced Soviet technology the careful analyst must ask to what 
purpose this technology has been put. Has it advanced general 
welfare so that its impact has been felt by the broad masses of the 
people? The Soviet Union has, after all, not been the only country 
which has made remarkable industrial progress over a relatively 
short period of time. Other countries have industrialized and suc-
ceeded in doing so without destroying entire sectors of their 
economies. As a model for other nations, therefore, the Soviet 
system is found wanting-unless it be admitted that sheer military 
and industrial power, unrelated to national welfare, are desirable 
ends in themselves. 
Finally, and perhaps most important of all, there is the matter 
of human cost. To what extent can it be said that it has "worked," 
if it continues to run counter to the inclinations and predilections 
of a large proportion of the population and if it can only be sus-
tained by force? 
The Government and Party of the Soviet Union and of the Peo-
pIe's Democracies claim to represent the working class. They claim 
to speak for the "toiling masses" and to be working for their 
best interests. Yet it is vital to remember that the peasant too is 
a member of the "toiling masses"; in fact, the tillers of the soil are 
still a majority of the population in the Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe, and China. To offer privilege and plenty to an elite of sci-
entists, engineers, and state functionaries is easy. The least progres-
sive and most exploitative of the world's societies have done as much 
for their own elites. The true test of progress-and incidentally of 
democracy-must be based on different criteria. It must show that 
just as much has been done for the citizen at large, both in 
the city and the countryside, for the humble as well as the exalted, 
for the unskilled as well as the skilled. 
N either the Soviet Union nor the other Communist states can 
pass this test. All of them have failed in their obligation to the 
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